An E-commerce transaction is a means to conduct particular commercial activities using the global digital E-commerce infrastructure. We concentrate here on business to customer (Bto-C) E-commerce transactions. These transactions are based on protocols offered by the global infrastructure, primarily the Internet. Using electronic means to do business can greatly improve the efficiency of the business transactions. It however poses some problems that were rarely considered to be important before. One class of problems is caused by the behavior of untrusted participants. For reasons such as dishonesty, disputes may arise. In the general case, when a dispute arises an untrustworthy participant may have an arbitrary behavior, and may or may not cooperate with the dispute handling process. In this paper, we study one class of disputes where the participants have some limited willingness to cooperate, and the causes or demands by the initiators are directly related to the actions in the transactions in which the disputes arise. To this end, we first establish a correctness criterion by extending the existing notion of transactional atomicity to a broader context where the behavior of untrustworthy players is taken into consideration. We then introduce the concept of a dispute, and the difficulties to handle it caused by abnormal behavior of players. We introduce a strategy, benefit set, based on which a solution is built to circumvent that behavior. Due to the special features of E-commerce transactions, we propose a two-tier arbiter structure as the main mechanism in our solution.
Introduction
E-commerce transactions allow people and/or companies to conduct commercial activities using the global digital E-commerce infrastructure. Using an electronic infrastructure to do business can greatly improve the efficiency of the business transactions. It however poses some problems that were rarely considered to be important before. For example, when a customer is trying to purchase a product through the Internet, how does she know if the person or company she is contacting is really the one who put the advertisement there in the first place? What provisions should be made in an E-commerce transaction protocol if some parties involved in the performance of the transaction are not trusted? On the Internet, it is hardly possible to know the trustworthiness of a party in advance each time one wants to perform a transaction, because anyone can set up an attractive E-commerce site with a little cost and be immediately in global business. Also, it is not possible to have a legally binding facility in electronic messages as easily and at such a low cost as a hand written signature. Third, E-commerce is really a global phenomenon and all local and national legislative instruments are insufficient to guarantee a legal framework for the activity.
Due to these factors, among others, E-commerce transaction protocols may not always be followed faithfully by all parties.
So disputes may arise in E-commerce for many reasons. Although many E-commerce transaction protocols have been proposed, very few of them have paid adequate attention to the support of dispute handling. To the best of our knowledge, the only work that studies this issue is reported in [1] , where some interesting issues are addressed, such as formulation of dispute claims, architecture of dispute handling systems, etc. (See Section 5 for more detail.) The directive in [6] contains the framework legislation for E-commerce. However, it gives neither any standard structure nor protocol for dispute handling. It regulates at an abstract level the ordering process (place order and confirm it) and everything else is left to market or member countries to decide.
In this paper, we study the aspects of an E-commerce transaction relating to dispute handling in an environment where the participating parties may be untrustworthy. We concentrate on one kind of disputes where the participants have some limited willingness to cooperate, and the causes or demands by the initiators are directly related to the actions in the transactions in which the disputes arise. Our main contributions are the following: (1) We establish a correctness criterion, based on which the dispute handling mechanism is built, by extending the existing notion of transactional atomcity [17] to a broader context where the behavior of untrustworthy players is taken into consideration; (2) We introduce a strategy, called benefit set, to circumvent the untrustworthy behavior of players; (3) We propose a model for an E-commerce transaction protocol that supports the dispute handling process and introduce a two-tier arbiter structure that resolves a dispute in a semi-algorithmic way.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe E-commerce transactions, their structures and semantics. In this section, the concept of dispute is also introduced. In Section 3, we introduce the E-commerce transaction protocol and its representation.
Then we introduce the concept of a benefit set. After that we introduce a two-tier arbiter structure based on the previous concepts. In Section 4, we discuss some related issues. We conclude the paper by presenting the related work and summarizing the main results.
E-commerce Transactions

Structure
An E-commerce transaction involves a number of players. Each player is associated with a role.
For the purpose of this paper, we always include two roles, customer and merchant. The role of a customer is to make a payment to the merchant and as a result receive some goods. The role of a merchant is to deliver the goods in exchange for the payment he receives from the customer. The goods can be electronic (in the terminology of [6] these are Information Society Services, ISS) or tangible. There is a third role, called arbiter. This role is solely for resolving a dispute, should one occur. (In reality, there may also be other roles involved in a transaction, such as banks or credit card companies, which are responsible for the real transfer of funds between the customer and the merchant, intermediate servers that perform certain authentication for the players, etc. Since the presence of these roles will not alter our discussion in an essential way, we omit them in this paper.) In the following discussion, for ease of references, we will use the term 'player' to also denote its role.
Structurally, an E-commerce transaction is a sequence of three logical operations: negotiation, purchasing, and an optional remediation, as depicted in Figure 1 .
During negotiation, customers and merchants try to reach an agreement on the terms and conditions on the goods to be purchased and their prices. A successful negotiation is followed by the purchasing operation, which consists of three sub-operations. (The double arrowed line indicates that fund_transfer and goods_delivery can be in either order, depending on the transaction.) Given below are their definitions, where we use result to denote the negotiation results, o a purchase order, c a customer, and m a merchant. If operation place_order( ) succeeds, a purchase order o will be generated. The generated purchase order legally binds c and m by describing the goods to be purchased, such as the name, model, quantity, manufacturer, etc., and the price to be paid. (It may also specify additional constraints such as the delivery date, the deadline for the payment, etc.) We use price(o) and goods_des(o) to denote the price and the description of the goods specified in o. We can now define purchasing operation as: The operation remediation refers to a process to resolve disputes that may subsequently arise following the purchasing operation. We will discuss it in more detail in Section 2.4.
Atomicity
An E-commerce transaction must possess certain properties to be practically useful. In this section, we discuss these properties. The following definitions 1 and 2 rephrase the money and goods atomicity proposed in [17] . Since the theme of this paper is to handle the anomalies directly related to the players in the execution of transactions, we will assume that fund transfer and goods delivery operations always succeed. Then, purchase atomicity can possibly be violated only in two cases:
(1) the order is placed, but the customer (merchant) has prepared incorrect payment (goods), or (2) no order is placed, but there are some none-zero fund transferred/goods delivered.
The second case is rare. Hence, we will mainly consider the first case.
States and Actions
The notion of atomicity has a simple representation in terms of transaction state (or simply, 'state'). We can view a state as a mapping from {order, money, goods} to {−1, 0, 1}. order takes a value of 1 if an order has been placed, and 0 otherwise. money takes a value of 1 if the full payment is transferred, −1 if an insufficient payment is transmitted, and 0 if no payment has been made. We store into data item goods a value of 1 if the goods are delivered that meet the conditions as specified in the purchase order, −1 if the delivered goods do not meet those conditions, and 0 if no goods have been delivered. We can see that if the value of <order, money, goods> is <1,1,1> or <0,0,0>, then purchase atomicity is preserved.
Actions are the physical operations that implement the logical operations in an E-commerce transaction. For example, 'customer made a payment to merchant', and 'bank sent a confirmation to merchant' are actions. A proposition may claim occurrence or non-occurrence of an action.
An action that is related to a state variable is termed a state-sensitive action. As will be seen in later sections, state-sensitive actions play an important role in dispute handling.
Each action has an initiator, which is the subject part in the action statement. In particular,
if an action is a message delivery, the sender of the message is always the initiator.
Remediation Revisited
Disputes are usually caused by abnormal behavior of humans. Human anomalies are harder to handle than machine anomalies. For example, in the current literature, most practical methods dealing with machine anomalies assume fail-stop behaviors. This is because even for very limited non-fail-stop machine malfunctions, the solutions mainly have paper value only. (Consider Byzantine General problems [10] , for example.) For human related anomalies, however, assuming fail-stop behavior is not realistic. Moreover, for intentional human anomalies, the offenders may try to cover it up. This may include, for example, supplying false information to show their innocence, and denying wrong doing when no one can prove otherwise. In most cases, a malfunctioning machine does not have this capability. In the face of these difficulties, dispute handling provides an alternative in attacking human anomalies.
Structure of Dispute Handling
Remediation is a collection of zero or more operations, called dispute resolutions. Each dispute resolution consists of three parts, dispute initiation, investigation and decision making.
Dispute Initiation
Normally, a dispute results from failure of some players to fulfill certain obligations. We formulate a dispute initiation as a five tuple <initiator, target, complaint, request, Tid>.
• The initiator identifies the player who initiates the dispute.
• The target indicates the player (or set of players) against whom the dispute is initiated.
• The complaint is a pair of sets of statements (Y, N). The interpretation of this pair is as follows: the dispute initiator claims that all the statements in Y are true and all the statements in N should also be true but in reality they are not.
• The request is a set of statements, each of which states an action that the initiator wishes to be taken, in order to repair the damages that he thinks the target has done to him.
• Finally, the Tid identifies the transaction for which the dispute is initiated.
A statement can be represented by a variety of forms. One of the most commonly used is the prefix form, whereby a statement is represented as <operation, subject, object>, meaning that subject performs operation on object. Note that, in the general case, the operation part may be associated with some attributes. For example, `pay by credit card before April 10, 2000' where`by credit card' and `before April 10, 2000' are two attributes.
The essential parts of a dispute initiation are the complaint and the request. In the general case, the dispute initiator needs to establish two assertions:
(1) all the statements in set Y are true and those in set N are not.
(2) when all the statements in Y are true the statements in set N represent the obligations of the associated subjects. (In the following, we call this assertion a YN-Obligation.)
We can use purchase atomicity as a criterion to check for the fulfillment of obligations. Since the request, not the complaint, is the ultimate goal of the initiator, if a request contributes to the preservation of purchase atomicity, then it is an obligation to be fulfilled, and, therefore, should be honored. In this case, we do not even need to consider the complaint.
From the above discussion, whether or not the request statements contribute to the preservation of purchase atomicity is the very first thing the arbiter needs to know. This in turn requires him to have knowledge about the current transaction state in which the dispute is initiated.
Investigation
In this phase, the arbiter tries to construct the current transaction state. to maximize the likelihood that they will be cooperative.
Decision Making
This is where the arbiter decides if the request by the dispute initiator will be honored or rejected.
The arbiter tries to construct the current state, and then uses purchase atomicity as the base for his decision. If the arbiter can indeed construct the state, a decision can possibly be made algorithmically; otherwise, the arbiter has to exercise his or her discretion.
6. After she receives the goods, the customer sends back a receipt to the merchant that uniquely identifies the goods she has received.
We assume that once the delivery slip (receipt) has been sent, the recipient will get it. We now formally describe a protocol.
Definition 4:
A normal protocol is a quadruple <M, P, F, (S, p )> where M is a set of message types, P is a set of players, S is a set of symbols, F is a mapping, F: S → M×P×P, and (S, p ) is a partial order, such that Protocol 1, we have: M = {pay, delivery, slip, receipt, order, order_confirmation, order_rejection}, P = {customer, merchant}. S is a set of distinct symbols, one for each occasion where a message is sent in the protocol. F specifies the message type sent, the sender and the receiver at each occasion.
p represents the temporal orders between messages.
A normal protocol, however, deals only with normal executions. Since the protocol is the most important reference for an arbiter to pin-point the current state in dispute handling, we would like it to contain maximum information. For this purpose, we will extend a protocol to also contain certain exceptions. A message that does not meet the specification is termed a bad message, otherwise, it is a good message. (In case no confusion is possible, we omit the preceding 'good'.)
Insufficient payments and goods with defects are examples of bad messages. In the following, we use bad t to denote the type for a bad message of type t. 
Protocol tree
A protocol, either normal or extended, implies a partial order of message transmissions. We shall represent it in a tree structure.
Definition 6:
Let T = <M, P, F, (S, p )> be a protocol, either normal or extended, and immd p be a subset of p that denotes 'immediately precede'. The protocol tree of T, denoted as tree(T), is an arc-labeled non-empty tree defined as follows. For any node n, • if n is the root, then for each minimal element r∈ S (i.e., wrt. p ), we generate a child c of n, and label the arc (n, c) with F(r), and • if n is not the root, let p be its parent and s ∈ S be the element for which n is generated. Then for each r∈ S such that s immd p r, we generate a child c for n and label the arc (n, c) with F(r). Figure 2 is the protocol tree for the extended protocol for Protocol 1. We extend Protocol 1 by defining the generating set as {pay, delivery}, and generated set as {bad pay, bad delivery}. We then predict the messages that might be transmitted after these bad messages. In the tree, each node is an execution stage that is entered after all of the preceding message transmissions have taken place. The subtree containing all the solid arcs is the protocol tree for Protocol 1, and the set of subtrees containing broken arcs are the extensions. For each node in the tree for Protocol 1, we attach a letter 'G' to indicate that it is preceded by good message transmissions, and for each node in the extended parts we attach a letter 'B' to signify that it follows a bad message transmission. Since a path describes a class of similar executions 1 , if it ends at a G-node then all the messages transmitted are good. In particular, if it ends at a G-node that is a leaf node, atomicity is preserved. On the other hand, no B-node preserves atomicity.
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Supporting Dispute Handling
Benefit Set
As mentioned before, in order for the arbiter to make a judgment, players may need to prove that they or other players have or have not taken certain actions. The issue here is to maximize the likelihood that they will be cooperative.
Definition 7:
Let T be an extended protocol tree, and p be a player. The benefit set of p w.r.t. T, denoted as benefit(p,T), is a set of propositions such that r ∈ benefit(p,T), if and only if, all the following conditions are true:
(1) r claims a state-sensitive action a (2) (initiator(a) = p) ⇒ (r claims occurrence of a and the arc for action a points to a G-node ) or (r claims non-occurrence of a and the arc for action a connects a G-node to a B-node) (3) (initiator(a) ≠ p) ⇒ ( r claims occurrence of a and the arc for action a connects a G-node to a B-node) or (r claims non-occurrence of a and the arc for action a points to a G-node)
Simply put, the propositions in the benefit set of a player claim that he/she has (has not) taken actions contributing to preserving (destroying) atomicity, or other players have (have not)
taken actions that contribute to destroying (preserving) atomicity. The motivation here is that a player should have little worry to prove any proposition with a truth value of 'true' in his/her benefit set if he/she is able to do so. Let T be the extended protocol tree in Figure 2 . Based on Definition 7, the benefit sets of the customer and the merchant with respect to T are as follows 2 .
benefit(CUSTOMER, T): Note that some propositions are strictly stronger than some others, such as C2 than C3, C5 than C4, etc. Nonetheless, in each pair both propositions must be included. This is because they generate different states. (For example, C2 always assigns 1 while C3 may assign 0 to money.)
Omitting either one may result in losing state information, and hence, cannot guarantee that a complete state will be constructed after all the propositions with truth values of 'true' are proven.
(Refer to the discussion following Theorem 1 in the next subsection.)
Using Benefit Sets to Construct Transaction States
Maximizing the likelihood that players are willing to provide proofs is the motivation for the way we defined benefit sets. The question is: can we obtain a complete transaction state after the propositions in the benefit sets are proven? The result is contained in the following theorem. For easy presentation, we will use the phrase 'positive (negative) proposition on action a' to refer to a proposition that claims the occurrence (non-occurrence) of action a. We say that a proposition is true at a node in an extended protocol tree, iff, the actions that have/have not occurred by the time when the transaction execution reaches that node make the proposition true. We say an action a is in a path if the arc labeled a is in the path.
Theorem 1:
Let R−D be a path where R is the root in an extended protocol tree. Then for any state-sensitive action a: (1) it is in this path iff there is a positive proposition on it in some benefit set that is true at node D, and (2) it is not in this path, iff, there is a negative proposition on it in some benefit set that is true at node D.
Proof: First note that from the way a benefit set is constructed, for any state-sensitive action a present in the protocol tree, there is both a positive and a negative proposition on it in some benefit sets. Notice that a is in R−D iff it has occurred when the transaction execution reaches node D. By definition, the positive proposition on a is true at node D iff action a has occurred when the transaction execution reaches node D. Thus, Assertion 1 is true. Assertion 2 directly follows from Assertion 1 and the first statement in this proof.
Assume a dispute is initiated at node D. Theorem 1 states that the set of all the propositions in the benefit sets that are true at node D completely identifies the state-sensitive actions that have or have not occurred when the transaction execution reaches D. This implies that the state of node D can be constructed using these propositions. Consider node E 2 in Figure 2 , for example. The propositions that are true at this node are M1, M5, C2, and C4. They give the state: the merchant has confirmed the order, the customer paid in full, but the merchant has not yet delivered either good or bad goods. As can be seen from the figure, this is indeed the state for node E 2 . (Notice that based on the propositions that are true in a state one cannot in general reconstruct completely the path which was followed to reach the state. To see this, assume that the protocol allows operations to commute (e.g. pay =a k and deliver =a i can happen in any order). Let SS(D) = <a 1 ,..a s ,a k ,a i > and SS(D') = <a 1 ,..,a s ,a i ,a k > be the paths that lead to nodes D and D', respectively. In both nodes the same propositions are true. Consequently, the states are the same. Still, the paths followed are different. However, since both paths lead to the same state, such a difference will not affect the arbiter's decision.)
Realizing Arbiter Using a Two-Tier Structure
From the previous discussions, if the arbiter has complete knowledge about the current state, then it can immediately make a judgment on whether or not the request by the dispute initiator installs atomicity for the current state, otherwise, human involvement is necessary. From this perspective, it is appropriate to implement the arbiter using a two-tier structure, a computer software and a human. The software arbiter first tries to generate an algorithmic solution. It does this by first constructing the benefit set for each player. It then sends these benefit sets to the players for proving. The players then try to prove those propositions and inform the software arbiter of the results. Based on these results, the software arbiter may or may not be able to make a decision. In case it cannot, it turns the case over to the human arbiter for arbitration.
Constructing Benefit Sets
The algorithm can be developed almost entirely based on Definition 7. Let X be a player, and P(X) be the benefit set for him/her. For each action A, let I(A) denote its initiator.
Algorithm 1 -constructing the benefit sets 5. For each state-sensitive action A which ends at a G-node, include into set benefit(I(A)) a statement saying "I(A) has taken action A", and into set benefit(J) a statement saying "I(A) did not take action A", where J is a different player from I(A);
6. For each state-sensitive action A that starts from a G-node and ends at a B-node, include into set benefit(I(A)) a statement saying "I(A) did not take action A", and into set benefit(J) a statement saying "I(A) has taken action A";
It is easy to verify that when we apply the above algorithm to the protocol tree in Figure 2 we obtain exactly the benefit sets given in Section 3.3.1. Note that from the way the benefit set is constructed, at any stage of a transaction, every player knows the truth value of every proposition in his/her own benefit set. This point is essential for the effectiveness of the arbiter system.
Generating a Decision
We focus our attention on how the software arbiter works. The method is described by the following Algorithm. • Mark(statement_set, EPT) simply marks the arcs in EPT for the actions that are claimed to have occurred or not occurred by the propositions in statement_set. The marked tree will be referenced by some other functions.
• CanConstructState(statement_set, EPT) returns true if the propositions in statement_set can determine a complete state in EPT, and false otherwise.
• CanProve1(player, proposition ,tid) should be viewed as a communication interface (such as a remote procedure call). It returns true if player can prove that proposition is true for transaction tid, and false otherwise. (See [4] on theorem proving.)
• CanProve2(initiator, yes_set, no_set, tid) is also a communication interface. It returns true if initiator can prove that the propositions in yes_set are true, those in no_set are false, and the YN-Obligation for transaction tid is valid, and false otherwise.
• Function Refine(statement_set) discards from statement_set those propositions that are strictly weaker than some other proposition in the same set.
• The function GetNode(EPT, statement_set) returns a node where every proposition in statement_set is true.
• The function Atomicity(G, EPT) works on node G whose state is given. It returns true if this state possesses atomicity, and false otherwise.
• The function GetNewSet(statement_set, request) integrates statement_set and request by every arc marked with Y precedes every arc marked with N 3.
then return (true) 4. return (false) Figure 4 . Determining if the current state can be constructed
for each h′ ∈ SS such that h′≠ h 4.
if h implies h′ then 5.
SS′ ← SS′ ∪ { h' } 6. return (SS − SS′ ) if D is a B-node then 3.
return (false) 4.
else if at least one arc in y is marked with N then 5.
return (false) 6. else 7.
return (true) Figure 8 . Determining if a node preserves atomicity
In Algorithm 2, in line 7, a node with the current state is returned. When control reaches line 9, the current state preserves atomicity, and hence the initiator's request will either destroy or be unrelated to atomicity. In the former case, it is a compensation, and in the latter case, it is ad-hoc.
If the initiator can show that the target indeed has some obligation to fulfill, the software arbiter will ask the human arbiter to decide if the request is reasonable, otherwise it will not consider that request. When control reaches line 18, the current state does not preserve atomicity but the initiator's request reinstalls it, the software arbiter immediately accepts the request. When the control reaches line 19, the initiator's request does not reinstall atomicity. But if he can prove the target failed to fulfill an obligation, then his request will still be considered, otherwise, it will be rejected immediately.
In the function CanConstructState( ), if SS is the set of all the propositions in the benefit sets that are true at some node in EPT, the existence of a complete path that meets the conditions in order to justify the compensation requests in these cases will most likely require external evidence, such as oral promises, written promises via e-mails, or faxes, etc. A detailed discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper.
Scenarios
In this section we give two scenarios which serve as examples to illustrate how a two-tier structured arbiter functions. These scenarios are based on the extended protocol tree in Figure 2 .
The benefit sets constructed in each scenario are the ones shown in Section 3.3.1. prove the YN-Obligation to the satisfaction of the arbiter, then the arbiter will make a suggestion to the human arbiter; otherwise, her request will be rejected.
Discussion
Our discussion so far has assumed that the players are not always trustworthy. In reality, however, some players may be generally viewed as trusted. One example is a bank. When trusted players are present, the general framework discussed in the paper is still applicable, except that we do not need to preclude from the benefit set of a trusted player any proposition relating to messages sent to or received from it. Neither do we need to include these propositions into the benefit sets of other players.
Another related aspect concerns the practical significance of the decisions made by arbiters.
In the real world, a decision made by a judge will be enforced. Can we say the same for the arbiter here? Solving theses issues requires a cooperative effort from other sectors of our society. For example, a dispute handling mechanism for E-commerce transactions must, first, gain the recognition of the governments of all the countries that are willing to participate in such a system.
Then it must obtain a proper legal status in order for the decision made by an arbiter to be legally binding. Although these issues are by no means easy, and still require a great deal of investigation, yet they are important.
It is worth noting that any message transmission in an E-commerce transaction may be associated with a temporal constraint. Our model can be extended to include them in a straightforward manner. The only change we need to make is: if in the purchase order a message type is associated with a temporal constraint we will consider it as a special attribute which does not have an impact on whether the message itself is 'good' or 'bad'. (For example, if a message with a type of 'goods' is associated with a deadline, then it is still a good message even if its delivery does not meet that deadline.) Now our arbiter system functions as is. The initiator of a dispute may now make a stronger case than before by establishing a YN -Obligation that would be impossible without a temporal constraint. For example, suppose the customer complains 'the merchant did not deliver before April 15' and requests 'refund 50% of the total price', where 'April 15' has been written on the purchase order as the deadline for the goods delivery. Now the customer can formulate a YN-Obligation as: Y = {(payment, customer, merchant)}, N = {(deliver:
before April 15, merchant, customer)}. She can show that the merchant did not fulfill his obligation, and hence add some weight to her request. She would not be able to establish this YNObligation if 'April 15' had not been written on the purchase order.
Related Work and Concluding Remarks
E-commerce transactions have been studied extensively in the last decade. A comprehensive review is given in [9] . Many protocols with varying levels of security guarantee have been
proposed [2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 14, 21] . Atomicity is an issue that has been thoroughly explored in database transactions in the last two decades [8, 12, 20] . Its relevance to E-commerce transactions is introduced in [17, 18] . In [13, 19] , the authors give a more detailed analysis on the transactional
properties of E-commerce transactions. However, these work have not paid attention to dispute handling, except for [1] .
The salient feature in [1] is a language that can be used to express some sophisticated claims by a dispute initiator and an architecture for a dispute handling mechanism in payment systems.
However, in their formulation, there is no mention of a correctness criterion based on which a decision can be made. Thus, it is unclear how such a system can determine whether or not any request by the dispute initiator should be honored.
An E-commerce transaction is very different from traditional transactions. In this environment, not only can machines fail, but some players may also act maliciously. We study one of the strategies to handle human related anomalies. That is to let a player raise a dispute, which will then be handled by a dispute handling system, in an attempt to post-protect his interest if the player is indeed the victim. To this end we study a model for E-commerce transactions, and introduce both the theoretical and the implementation aspects. Among these are the concept of benefit set for circumventing the untrustworthiness of players, and a two-tier arbiter structure.
Some issues deserve further study. Our benefit set model assumes the willingness of cooperation by all the players, including untrustworthy ones, on proving things that 'do not conflict' with their interests. If some players are not as cooperative then the effectiveness of the two-tier arbiter system deteriorates. A possible approach would be to make it possible also for a player to do the proving of propositions in other players' benefit sets. How this affects the performance needs to be analyzed. Another issue is concerned with the capability of the software arbiter. In the current system, a software arbiter is not capable of handling any request for compensation, neither can it handle disputes not related to atomicity. This is because the structures and semantic contents of these requests or disputes usually are more irregular than those under the framework of purchase atomicity. A possible solution is to let the software arbiter do supervised learning. It can be trained first with a set of predefined requests as well as the answers to these requests. It will then classify the new requests based on the learned knowledge. Here an important issue is how to formulate a training instance using a request. Exactly how the supervised learning is structured in the context of arbiters is an interesting topic to explore.
